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PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE REMEDY IN SHAREHOLDER
SUITS AGAINST OFFICERS, DIRECTORS, AND
CONTROLLING PERSONS

Corporate officers, directors, and controlling persons' occupy a fiduciary
relationship toward the corporation and its shareholders in the exercise of
control over corporate affairs. 2 This fiduciary obligation requires that officers, directors, and controlling persons act in good faith 3 and perform
their offices in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders and
not to their own advantage. 4 When this duty is breached, a shareholder
may bring an action against these fiduciaries, either in his own name or
derivatively for the benefit of the corporation. 5 Under present law, however, it may be impossible for an American court to secure jurisdiction
over a foreign person occupying such a fiduciary relationship. Furthermore, even if a foreign fiduciary is subject to the jurisdiction of a domestic
court, present law allows judgments against such persons to remain unsatisfied, unless the foreign defendant has assets in the United States apart
from his interest in a domestic corporation."
1 For purposes of this article the term "controlling person" shall be synonymous
with "principal shareholder" as that term is defined in section 16(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970), i.e., "[e]very person who is directly
or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum of any class of any
equity security ......
2 See, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogart, 250 U.S. 483 (1919), in which a majority
shareholder was held to act as trustee of the minority interests in a corporate reorganization; Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 263 F.2d 748 (5th Cir.
1959), in which the officers and directors of a liquidated corporation were found to
have a duty to shareholders whose stock was purchased by the corporation prior to the
liquidation; Higgins v. Shenango Pottery Co., 256 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1958), in which
the officers of a corporation were held liable to the shareholders for the diversion of
corporate business; and Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947),
in which a controlling shareholder was held accountable to the minority for directing
the corporation to exercise redemption rights over the minority's stock at a price
lower than the eventual liquidation value. See generally Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S.
295 (1939).
3 See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton,'308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939); Higgins v. Shenango Pottery
Co., 256 F.2d 504, 507 (3d Cir. 1958).
4 See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939); Higgins v. Shenango Pottery Co., 256 F.2d 504, 508 (3d Cir. 1958).
5 If the duty breached is owed directly to the shareholder, the action may be
brought by the shareholder in his own name. Where the duty breached is one owed
to the corporation and the corporation fails to enforce its rights, a shareholder may
bring the action for the benefit of the corporation. See generally N. LATTIN, THE LAW
OF CORPORATIONS 410-62 (2d ed. 1971).
6 Recent revelations concerning the relationship of Hermann Mayer, an Austrian
national, to General Refractories Company, Inc. illustrate the problem. Mayer, the
beneficial owner of 17 percent of General Refractories Company's outstanding common stock, was accused by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of
having used his position as a major shareholder to influence corporate decisions to
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One means of securing jurisdiction over or enforcing a judgment against
a corporate officer, director, or controlling person is to attach her stock
interest in the corporation. Statutes in forty-nine states, however, provide that a person's interest in a corporation may be levied against only by
seizing the stock certificates which represent the interest. Thus, a foreign
shareholder whose only property interests within the United States consist
of corporate stock may avoid effective judicial action merely by keeping
7
the stock certificates outside the United States.
The most obvious means of providing shareholders with an effective
remedy in such situations would be to provide for the initiation of suits for
breach of fiduciary duty against officers, directors, and controlling persons
by the attachment of their share interests in the state of incorporation.8
This article will examine the compatibility of such a provision with the
policies underlying the present law and with Supreme Court pronouncements questioning the constitutionality of prejudgment seizure of property.
Specific amendments to both the ABA-ALI Model Business Corporation
Act and Article Eight of the Uniform Commercial Code9 are proposed in
an appendix to this article.
I.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE LAW OF ATTACHMENT
OF CORPORATE SHARES

The law of attachment of corporate shares has evolved primarily
in response to the changing role of the corporation in our economic systhe detriment of General Refractories and to the benefit of various European concerns owned by Mayer. Despite Mayer's refusal to give depositions and supply
documents, a federal district court judge has granted a preliminary injunction barring
Mayer, certain of his associates, and certain associated companies from engaging
in transactions in General Refractories Company shares. Wall St. J., Sept. 25, 1975,
at 4, col. 2.
If the SEC allegations are true, Mayer has breached his fiduciary duty as a controlling person. Under existing law, however, the shareholders of General Refractories may be unable to bring an effective action based on this violation, since
whether or not Mayer is subject to the personal jurisdiction of an American court
the chances are good that he has no property subject to the jurisdiction of an American court.
7 If a foreign shareholder were subject to personal service, there would be no
property in the United States against which to enforce such a judgment. If the foreign
shareholder were not subject to personal service, a quasi in rem action could not be
maintained since no court would have jurisdiction over the share interests.
This same problem may occur where an officer, director, or controlling person
leaves the United States. When Robert Vesco fled to Costa Rica to avoid prosecution
for the looting of four mutual funds, he owned approximately $1 million in common
stock of the mutual funds' parent corporation, the rights to which are presently being
contested in a stockholder derivative action. Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 1975, at 26, col. 4.
8 A proposal to amend the ABA-ALI Model Business Corporation Act to include
such an attachment provision was taken under consideration by the Committee on
Corporate Laws of the American Bar Association Section on Corporation, Banking,
and Business Law in 1975. Letter from Orvel Sebring, Chairman, to the members of
the Committee on Corporate Laws, Feb. 21, 1975, on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform.
9 Article Eight, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
of stock interests. See part II infra.
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tem 10 and the evolution of the role played by the stock certificate in share
transfers." An understanding of the nexus between law and commercial
practice, therefore, is necessary before one attempts to evaluate the desirability of providing for the attachment of corporate shares without actual
seizure of stock certificates.
Prior to the nineteenth century, jurists treated an ownership interest in
a corporation as a chose in action which, like other intangible interests,
was not subject to levy. 12 Then, as now, a shareholder did not have any
right to specific corporate assets" and the shareholder's interest in the
corporation was considered incorporeal and incapable of being physically
14
seized or attached.
During the nineteenth century the concept of levy against intangible
interests was gradually accepted, and courts and legislatures recognized
that a shareholder's rights to receive profits and to participate in the distribution of corporate assets upon liquidation were valuable property
interests which should be subject to the demands of creditors and other
adverse claimants. 15 Many states adopted statutes under which the shareholder's interest was considered as having a situs in the state in which the
corporation was domiciled, 16 and which gave the courts of the domiciliary
17
state exclusive jurisdiction over matters concerning the interest.
Under these statutes the shareholder's interest existed only on the books
of the corporation, which were the sole evidence of ownership.' 8 Consequently, the shareholder's interest was subject to attachment only where
the corporate books were kept, that is, at the domicile of the corporation. 19
Levy was made on the shareholder's interest by service of notice on the
corporation. 20 If the attached interest was represented by stock certificates,
new certificates were issued to a purchaser at the execution sale, and the
outstanding certificates were made void and cancelled on the corporation's
books. 21 Since the property interest involved was merely the intangible
right to receive profits and to participate in the assets of the corporation
upon liquidation, the stock certificate was treated as having no intrinsic
10 See Wood, Reaching Shares of Stock, 38 W. VA. L.Q. 219 (1932).
11Id.
12 Moys v. Union Trust Co., 276 Pa. 58, 60, 119 A. 738 (1923); cf. Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R.R. v. Clarksdale, 257 U.S. 10, 21 (1921); United States Express Co.
v. Hurlock, 120 Md. 107, 113, 87 A. 834, 836 (1913).
13 See Pomerance, The "Situs" of Stock, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 43, 45 (1971).
14 Moys v. Union Trust Co., 276 Pa. 58, 60, 119 A. 738, 740 (1923).
15 See Wood, supra note 10, at 219.
16 See Ashley v. Quintard, 90 F. 84 (N.D. Ohio 1898); Winslow v. Fletcher, 53
Conn. 390, 4 A. 250 (1885); Cantor v. Sachs, 18 Del. Ch. 359, 162 A. 73 (Ch. 1932);
United States Express Co. v. Hurlock, 120 Md. 107, 87 A. 834 (1913); Plimpton v.
Bigelow, 93 N.Y. 592, 29 Hun 362 (1883).
17 See Wood, supra note 10, at 220.
18 See Beale, The Exercise of Jurisdiction In Rein to Compel Payment of a Debt,
27 HARV. L. REV. 107, 111 (1913); Loiseaux, Liability of Corporate Shares to Legal
Process, 1972 DUKE L.J. 947, 949; Wood, supra note 10, at 220.
19 Beale, supra note 18, at 111.
20 Loiseaux, supra note 18.
21

Id.
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value or legal significance. 22
This treatment of stock certificates developed at a time when corporations
were basically local enterprises and corporate assets formed a relatively
unimportant part of the national wealth. 23 During the latter part of the
nineteenth century this situation changed. Corporations became more important vehicles for holding assets and corporate ownership became more
widespread.24 Trading in shares of corporate stock increased. Stock certificates themselves became accepted as documents of value and purchasers
came to rely on the certificate as "representing for all practical purposes
25
the share itself."
The increased significance accorded stock certificates in commercial
markets brought to light the fundamental weakness of the traditional legal
approach to the transfer of a shareholder's interest in a corporation. While
stock certificates were traded as if an interest in the corporation was thereby transferred, under the law no change of ownership was accomplished
until the transfer was recorded on the corporation's books. 26 Upon hearing
that his shares had been attached, the holder of the certificates, therefore,
could sell or borrow against the stock interest by endorsement and delivery
of the certificate. 27 Since existing law did not recognize the negotiability of
the certificates, a good faith transferee in such instances was left with documents which the market had recognized, but which the law, and therefore
the corporation, treated as worthless. 28 Moreover, existing communications
technology made it impossible for lenders and purchasers to make an ef2
fective investigation prior to lending or purchasing.
The New York courts were the first to respond to the plight of subsequent transferees which this divergence of law and commercial practice
created by recognizing as valid attachments made by seizure of stock
certificates. 30 This procedure was gradually recognized in other jurisdictions3 1 and in 1907 was adopted as the basic means of attachment of
32
shareholder interests under the Uniform Stock Transfer Act (USTA).

22 Tryon v. Silverstein, 10 Ariz. App. 25, 455 P.2d 474, 477 (1969).
23 Wood, supra note 10, at 222.
24 Id.

25 Id.
26
Beale, supra note 18, at 111.
27 Cf. Pomerance, supra note 13, at 64.
28 See, e.g., People's Nat'l Bank v. Cleveland, 117 Ga. 908, 44 S.E. 20 (1903);
Young v. South Tredegar Iron Co., 85 Tenn. 189, 2 S.W. 202 (1886).
29 See Loiseaux, supra note 18, at 950.
30 See Simpson v. Jersey City Contracting Co., 165 N.Y. 193, 58 N.E. 896 (1900);
People ex rel. Wynn v. Grifenhagen, 167 App. Div. 572, 152 N.Y.S. 679 (1915);
General Motors Corp. v. Ver Linden, 199 App. Div. 375, 192 N.Y.S. 28 (1922); 2
W. COOK, CORPORATIONS 1272 (6th ed. 1908); Pomerance, supra note 13, at 63-64;
Wood, supra note 10, at 223-24.
31 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Leland Co., 246 F. 103 (9th Cir. 1917); Griswold v. KellySpringfield Tire Co., 94 N.J. Eq. 308, 120 A. 324 (1916); Pomerance, supra note 13,
at 63-64.
32 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED (1922). See COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS-NATIONAL CONFERENCE, FIRST DRAFT OF AN ACT TO MAKE UNIFORM THE LAW
OF CERTIFICATES OF STOCK (1907).
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The USTA attempted to give to stock certificates a legal significance
commensurate with their commercial importance 33 and, thereby, to eliminate the possibility of certificates being transferred to a bona fide purchaser
after the shareholder's interest had been attached. 34 The Act gave the stock
certificate legal importance by providing that a transfer of the certificate
would operate to transfer the shareholder's interest, 3 and that such transfer
would operate as an effective conveyance of title.3 6 So that a prior attachment could not be defeated by negotiation of the certificate to a bona fide
purchaser, the Act provided for effective attachment only where the certificate had been actually seized or surrendered to the issuer, or where the
37
holder was enjoined from transferring the certificates.
II. ATTACHMENT OF CORPORATE SHARES UNDER
CURRENT LAW

The USTA has been superseded by Article Eight of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in every jurisdiction except Louisiana. 38 Article
Eight endorses the basic policies underlying the USTA and expands its
coverage to include non-equity securities. 39 As explained by Professor
Carlos Israels, Chairman of the National Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws Subcommittee on Article Eight,
[t]he article is an attempt to modernize and simplify the law applicable to 'investment securities', . . . . first by endowing them
with negotiability in its full sense, and then by delineating the
rights of holder and issuer economically
and logically flowing
40
from and connected with negotiability.
33 Wood, supra note 10, at 225.
34 Crane v. Crane, 373 Pa. 1, 5, 95 A.2d 199, 201 (1953). See also 6 UNIFORM
LAWS ANNOTATED § 13, Commissioner's Note:

[I]t is clearly improper ever to allow an attachment of stock unless
some method is adopted to prevent a subsequent transfer of the certificate. Otherwise it is impossible to realize on the attached property
since there would always be a possibility of a subsequent transfer of
the original certificate.
6 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED § 1.
6 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED § 5.
37 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED § 13. This provision met with substantial opposition and was not enacted in a number of jurisdictions which adopted the Uniform Act.
See generally Austin & Nelson, Attaching and Levying on Corporate Shares, 16 Bus.
LAW. 336, 337 (1961); Note, Attachment of Corporate Stock: The Conflicting Approaches of Delaware and the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1579
(1960). 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED § 13 provided:
No attachment or levy upon shares of stock for which a certificate is
outstanding shall be valid until such certificate be actually seized by the
officer making the attachment or levy, or be surrendered to the corporation which issued it, or its transfer by the holder be enjoined.
35
36

38See

UNIFORM

COMMERCIAL

CODE

1972

OFFICIAL

TEXT,

TABLE

1

(1972).

Delaware has adopted a modified version of Article Eight. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§ 8-101 et seq. (1974). See notes 50-52 infra. Stock transfers in Louisiana are governed by the Louisiana version of the UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER ACT. LA.
STAT. ANN. § 12:621 et seq. (1968).
39 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§

REV.

8-102(1)(a), 8-105(1), 8-301(1), (2).
40 Israels, Investment Securities as Negotiable Paper-Article 8 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 13 Bus. LAW. 676, 677 (1958).
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Article Eight provides that "securities," 41 defined in the Code to include
any instrument, debt or equity, commonly traded on a security exchange,
are negotiable instruments, 42 and that a bona fide purchaser43 may take
a security free from any adverse claim, 44 including a claim that "a particular
adverse person is the owner of or has an interest in the security. ' 45 Thus,
Article Eight makes it clear that the intangible rights of a creditor or share46
holder do not exist apart from the certificate.
This primacy of the stock certificate is carried over in the Article Eight
provision on attachment and levy. 47 Section 8-317 of the UCC parallels
section 13 of the USTA, 48 except that the former provides for a valid levy
or attachment only if the security is actually seized by an officer of the
court or surrendered to the issuer.4 9 The provision in section 13 of the
USTA, recognizing as valid attachments where the holder of the certificate
was enjoined from transferring the certificate, is not included in section
8-317 of the UCC.5° The comments to section 8-317 make it clear that the
drafters were of the opinion -that recognition of attachment by enjoining
transfer would be inconsistent with the basic notion that no levy should
be valid unless "all possibility of the security finding its way into a transferee's hands" has been removed. 51
One important corporate jurisdiction, Delaware, has not accepted the
Article Eight treatment of attachment and levy. While Delaware has
§ 8-102(l)(a) provides:
(a) A "security" is an instrument which
(i) is issued in bearer or registered form; and
(ii) is of a type commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges or markets or commonly recognized in any area in which it is issued
or dealt in as a medium for investment; and
(iii) is either one of a class or series or by its terms is divisible into
a class or series of instruments; and
(iv) evidences a share, participation or other interest in property
or in an enterprise or evidences an obligation of the issuer.

41 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 8-105(1).
A bona fide purchaser is defined in UNIFORM

42 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

43

COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-302 as a
purchaser for value in good faith and without notice of any adverse
claim who takes delivery of a security in bearer form or of one in
registered form issued to him or endorsed to him or in blank.

44 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
45 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 8-301(2).
§ 8-301(1).

46 See Folk, Article Eight-Investment Securities, The Uniform Commercial Code
in North Carolina, 44 N.C.L. REV. 654 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Folk, Investment
Securities]. A minor exception to this general rule exists where a registered owner has
notified the issuer that the owner's securities have been lost or stolen. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-405(2).
47 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-317.
48 See note 37 supra.
49 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 8-317(1) provides:

(1) No attachment or levy upon a security or any share or other interest evidenced thereby which is outstanding shall be valid until the
security is actually seized by the officer making the attachment or levy
but a security which has been surrendered to the issuer may be attached
or levied upon at the source.
50 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
51 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§8-317(1).
§ 8-317, Comment 1.
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adopted most of the provisions of Article Eight, including provisions recognizing the negotiability of investment securities 52 and the priority of the
bona fide purchaser, 53 the Delaware version of section 8-317 leaves existing
statutory attachment and sequestration provisions unaffected by declaring
that they are controlling in the event of conflict with any provisions of the
54
Delaware version of Article Eight.
The principal method of attaching shares of a Delaware corporation
owned by a nonresident officer, director, or shareholder is to invoke the
Delaware sequestration statute, 55 which provides for the public sale of
sequestered property to induce the defendant to make a general appearance
56
and to satisfy the plaintiff's claim should the defendant fail to appear.
The statute avoids conflict with the bona fide purchaser provisions of Article Eight by providing that any assignment or transfer of the seized
property after sequestration shall be void. 57 This treatment of the transfer
denies a transferee the status of "purchaser," 58 and a fortiori, qualification
as a bona fide purchaser. 59 The statute further provides that, after seizure,
the public sale
shall transfer to the purchaser all the right, title and interest of
the defendant ... as fully as if the defendant ... [had] transferred
the same to the purchaser in accordance with law.60
Thus, where the seized property consists of securities, the purchaser at a
61
public sale assumes the status of a bona fide purchaser.
This provision would not be effective with regard to the attachment of
corporate shares, however, if shareholders were allowed to avoid its application by holding securities in a street name 62 or by using some other device
which separates legal and beneficial ownership. 63 To prevent this result the
52

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 8-105(1) (1974).
53 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 8-301(2) (1974).
54 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 8-317(1) (1974) provides:

(1) Nothing contained in this subtitle shall repeal, amend or in any
way affect sections 169 and 324, title 8, or sections 365 and 366, and
chapter 35, title 10; and to the extent that any provision of this subtitle [Article Eight] is inconsistent with such sections, sections 169 and
324, title 8, and 365 and 366 and chapter 35, title 10, shall be controlling.
55 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 366 (1974). See E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL
CORPORATION LAW: A COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS 569 (1972).
56 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 366(a) (1974) provides in part:
The Court may compel the appearance of the defendant by the seizure
of all or any part of his property, which property may be sold under
order of the Court to pay the demand of the plaintiff, if the defendant
does not appear, or otherwise defaults.
57 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 366(c) (1974).
5
8See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1-201(32), (33) (1974).
59 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 8-302 (1974). See note 43 supra.
60 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 366(c) (1974).
61 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 8-301(1), (2) (1974).
62 Securities registered in the name of a broker, securities dealer, or bank as a
nominee of the beneficial owner are said to stand in a "street name." C. ISRAELS & E.
GUTTMAN, MODERN SECURITIEs TRANSFERS § 3.09 (rev. ed. 1971).
63 Another device which a shareholder could use would be to transfer his securities
to a trust of which the shareholder was the beneficiary.
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Delaware courts have looked to beneficial ownership as the interest which
the equitable sequestration remedy seeks to reach.6 4 Thus, beneficial ownership has been dispositive in attempts to reach the interests of nonresident
corporate directors who were not shareholders of record, 65 as well as the
equitable interest retained by a transferor where the property was transferred with the intent of defrauding the transferor's creditors. 66 If the nonresident defendant holds merely legal title, the sequestered shares are
released upon application of the beneficial owners.6 7 The relevance of
beneficial ownership under the sequestration statute is limited only by the
availability of discovery by which a nonresident defendant's beneficial
interest can be identified with reasonable certainty. 8 Thus, Delaware is the
only state which provides shareholders with a fully effective remedy against
dishonest or incompetent officers, directors, and controlling persons; and
even in Delaware the effectiveness of the remedy is dependent on a judicially created doctrine and not on any express statutory language.

Il.

THE COMPATIBILITY OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS WITH CURRENT LAW

If amendments to the ABA-ALI Model Business Corporation Act and
Article Eight of the UCC are to provide shareholders with an effective
remedy against breaches of fiduciary duty by nonresident officers, directors,
and controlling persons, the attachment of shares beneficially owned by
such individuals must be possible by means of some procedure short of
actual seizure of the certificates. 69 The balance of this article will examine
the compatibility of such an attachment provision with the stated goal of
Article Eight of the UCC to make certificates fully negotiable and with the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
64

See, e.g., Green v. Johnston, 34 Del. Ch. 115, 99 A.2d 627 (Sup. Ct. 1953).

65 Id.
66 See Cheff v. Athlone Industries, Inc., 43 Del. Ch. 394, 233 A.2d 170 (Sup. Ct.
1967); Blumenthal v. Blumenthal, 28 Del. Ch. 1, 35 A.2d 831 (Ch. 1944), afl'd, 28
Del. Ch. 448, 39 A.2d 216 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
67 See United States Industries, Inc. v. Gregg, 348 F. Supp. 1004 (D. Del. 1972);
Yancey v. Nat'l Trust Co., -Del.
Ch.-, 251 A.2d 561 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Chasin v.

Gluck, 42 Del. Ch. 538, 216 A.2d 142 (Ch. 1965); Rebstock v. Lutz, 39 Del. Ch. 25,
158 A.2d 487 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
68 Compare Green v. Johnston, 34 Del. Ch. 115, 99 A.2d 627 (Sup. Ct. 1953), in
which two nonresident directors, appearing specially to seek dissolution of a sequestration order on the ground that they were not shareholders of record were required to answer interrogatories with respect to their beneficial ownership of corporate shares, and in which on appeal a subsequent writ of sequestration based on
the information obtained from the interrogatories was upheld, with Cannon v. Union
Chemicals and Materials Corp., 37 Del. Ch. 399, 144 A.2d 145 (Ch. 1958), in which
a shareholder was denied use of discovery procedures where the issuer corporation's
answer to the sequestration notice showed no shares of stock held in the name of
the defendant and a subsequent merger of the issuer corporation into a New Jersey
corporation deprived the Delaware courts of jurisdiction over the shares.
69 See notes 6-7 and accompanying text supra.
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A. The Proposed Amendments and Article Eight
of the Uniform Commercial Code

1. The Stock Certificate in Modern Securities Transfers-The fundamental policy of full negotiability of investment securities under the UCC
has never been seriously questioned. 70 The negotiability of stock certificates
under Article Eight is thought to facilitate the liquidity7' which securities
trading markets provide to investors 72 in that negotiability establishes the
priority of a bona fide purchaser and, thus, gives a necessary degree of
certainty to all share transactions. 73 In turn, the liquidity of stock certificates
is viewed as a key factor in the ability of corporations to raise capital and
to retain earnings for economic expansion.74 In recognition of this relationship between negotiability and liquidity, the priority of subsequent bona
fide transferees has been accorded ever greater importance since the USTA
was drafted. The protection of a bona fide transferee is now viewed in
terms of its impact on the national economic well-being, 75 not simply in
terms of fairness to the transferee, and one commentator has gone so far
as to state that modem securities markets could not function without the
"indispensable right of a bona fide purchaser for value to extinguish issuer
defenses and adverse claims to securities. ' '7 6 However, this view not only
overstates the case; it does not comport with modern commercial practice.
As the following discussion will illustrate, although providing for the attachment of corporate shares without the actual seizure of the stock certificates
would impair the full negotiability of the certificates, such a provision would
be entirely consistent with, and reflective of, present commercial practice.
Such a provision, therefore, should have only a minimum impact on share
liquidity and the certainty of transfer which the bona fide purchaser provision of Article Eight was supposed to provide.
The changes wrought by the USTA and its successor, Article Eight of
the UCC, were thought necessary to protect the bona fide purchaser who
relied upon the delivery of a stock certificate only to find that his interest
in the corporation was subordinated to that of an unknown judgment
creditor. 77 These changes, however, were developed in an era when elec-

70 See Folk, Article Eight: A Premise and Three Problems, Selected Problems Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1379, 1380 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Folk, A Premise].

71 The liquidity of a stock certificate is measured in terms of the ease of converting the certificate into cash.
72 See Smith, A Piece of Paper, 25 Bus. LAW. 923 (1970). Cf. Folk, Investment

Securities, supra note 46, at 654.
73 Cf. Folk, Investment Securities, supra note 46, at 654.
74 Smith, supra note 72, contends that if stock certificates
liquid, the ability of corporations to raise funds by selling new
duced because investors would move to other investment media
would be less willing to allow management to retain earnings if
disposing of their holdings was not available.
75 Id. at 924.
76

Folk, Investment Securities, supra note 46, at 654.

77 See part I supra.

were not so highly
issues would be reand equity investors
the option of easily
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tronic communication was unknown and buyers and sellers traded their
corporate interests in face-to-face transactions. 78 Under such conditions,
the physical transfer of tangible certificates was the quickest, safest, and
79
most practical means of meeting the demands of the market.
In most share transactions today, however, the role played by the stock
certificate is quite different.8 0 Most stock purchases are made through
brokers, 8 ' and it is the legal relationship between the buyer and his broker,
not the priority of a bona fide purchaser under Article Eight, which protects
the buyer's rights.8 2 This relationship between the buyer and his broker is
grounded on a contractual, as well as agency, theory, and exists independently of the legal relationships which develop in the stock transaction
between the buyer broker and the seller broker and between the seller
broker and the seller.8 3
Upon effectuation of the trade by the buyer and seller brokers a contract
arises between the buyer and his broker which obligates the latter to deliver
a stock certificate representing a specified number of corporate shares in
exchange for the selling price plus the broker's commission. 4 The buyer
normally will then have five days after receiving a confirmation of the trade
to fulfill his obligation to remit payment. 8 5 This contract will remain
executory on the part of the buyer broker, however, until delivery of the
certificate registered in the buyer's name some weeks or months after his
remittance of payment.8 6 Throughout this process the identity of the seller
is unknown to the buyer and the certificate which the buyer eventually
receives is almost never the seller's certificate.8 7 The buyer, therefore, looks
solely to his broker and not to the seller for performance. 88
Although it may be weeks or months before the purchaser receives the
certificates representing his purchase,8 9 enforceable legal relationships arise
from the time the seller and purchaser first contact their respective brokers,
and it is the seller broker who, pursuant to these relationships, assumes the
ultimate risk that the seller's delivery of the certificate will be timely and
proper. 90 In making a trade the seller broker assumes an obligation under
both the UCC 91 and, where the transaction occurs on an exchange, under

78 See REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE ON STOCK CERTIFICATES, SECTION ON CORPORATION, BANKING, AND BUSINESS LAW 2-3 (Sept. 15,
1975) [hereinafter cited as ABA REPORT].
791d.
80 Id. at 3. See also Werner, The Certificateless Society: Why and When?, Syrnposium on the CertificatelessSociety, 26 Bus. LAW. 605 (1971).
81 See generally ABA REPORT, supra note 78, at 4.
82

Werner, supra note 80, at 606.

83 See ABA REPORT, supra note 78, at 4-5; Werner, supra note 80, at 606.
84 ABA REPORT, supra note 78, at 4.
85 Id.

SOld.
87 Id. at 5.
88

Id.

89 Id. at 4.

9OId. at 5.
91 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 8-306, 8-313, 8-314.
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exchange rules 92 to deliver a certificate to the buyer broker free of adverse

claims and defenses. The buyer broker in turn relies on the seller broker's
obligation in sending the confirmation of purchase to the buyer. Since the
certificate follows legal relationships established in the market and does
not create those relationships, 93 it must be concluded that the impairment
of the full negotiability of stock certificates which would result from a
provision recognizing attachments by means of service of notice on the
corporation would have little or no impact on the functioning of the securities markets from the point of view of a purchaser.
Such a provision would, however, affect the position of seller brokers,
who would shoulder the ultimate risk should an attempt be made to transfer certificates representing the attached shares. For example, a seller
broker will often effectuate a trade without having the seller's certificate in
its possession. In such cases, the seller broker transfers either certificates
from inventory or certificates bought or borrowed specifically for the
purpose of settling that obligation to the buyer broker. 94 The seller usually
has five days after receipt of confirmation of the trade to deliver her
certificates, which the seller broker will then attempt to have registered in
its own name to replace those transferred in the settlement process. 95 If the
share interest represented by the certificate has been attached by service of
notice on the corporation, the certificates would be cancelled upon receipt
by the corporation or its transfer agent. The seller broker, assuming payment had been remitted, 96 would then be left with an action against the
seller. The result would generally be the same where the seller broker had
possession of the certificates when the trade was made since a seller broker
will generally register certificates out of the seller's name prior to their
transfer to another broker.117 In those rare transactions in which the seller's
certificates are transferred between brokers directly by endorsement, the
ultimate risk would still fall on the seller broker because of its obligation
to deliver certificates free of adverse claims or defenses.98
Without modification, the present legal structure of the market would,
therefore, place the burden on the seller broker to be aware of the fact that
its customer is an officer, director, or controlling person of the corporation
92 See, e.g., N.Y. Stock Exch. Const. art. XII, §§ 1, 2, reprinted in 2 CCH
N.Y. STOCK ExcH. GUIDE, para. 1551-52.
93 Werner, supra note 80, at 606.
94 See ABA REPORT, supra note 78, at 5. Even if the seller's certificates were endorsed directly to the buyer broker, the selling broker would bear the ultimate risk
as he would have violated his obligation to deliver a clean certificate. See notes 91,
92 supra.
95 See ABA REPORT, supra note 78, at 4-5.
,96 In most transactions a seller will receive a credit to her account with the seller
broker rather than immediate payment upon delivery of her certificates. See ABA
REPORT, supra note 78, at 4.
97 See, e.g., New York Stock Exchange Rules 195-225, reprinted in 2 CCH N.Y.
STOCK ExCH. GUIDE, para. 2195-2225 which limit the concept of "good" delivery with
the result that most shares are registered out of the seller's name, prior to their
transfer between brokers. Cf. C. ISRAELS & E. GUTTMAN, MODERN SECURITIES TRANSFERS § 6.06 (rev. ed. 1971).
98 See notes 91-92 and accompanying text supra.
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whose stock is to be sold, and that such shares are subject to levy without
seizure of the certificates. While this burden may require a seller broker to
conduct investigations of customers prior to trading in the securities
markets on their behalf, it should be noted that existing rules of the New
York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, the National Association of Securities Dealers, and the Securities and Exchange Commission
already impose just such an obligation of investigation on all brokers. 9
As a practical matter, a provision recognizing valid attachments by means
of service of notice on the issuer corporation would merely place on a seller
broker the burden of verifying the rightfulness of. the seller's transfer by
contacting the issuer prior to remitting payment. 10 0
Ironically, the present market system with its legal emphasis on the
delivery of stock certificates is now considered a serious impediment to the
free transfer of share interests which it was designed to promote. 01 Increased volume in the late 1960's forced securities markets to shorten
trading hours and to restrict trading activities of firms unable to keep cur-

99 See New York Stock Exchange Rule 405, reprinted in 2 CCH N.Y. STOCK EXCH.
GUIDE, para. 2405; American Stock Exchange Rule 411, reprinted in 2 CCH AM.
STOCK ExcH. GUIDE, para 9431; Section 27 of the Rules of Fair Practice of the
National Association of Securities Dealers, reprinted in CCH NASD DEALERS MANUAL, para. 2177; SEC Rule 15b10-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-4 (1975); SEC Rule
144(g), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(g) (1975).
The obligation created by these rules is generally described as the "know your
customer" doctrine. The rules generally require the exercise of "due diligence" to
learn the essential facts relative to every customer, order, and account.
It should be noted that the liability of a broker for consummating a customer's
fraudulent transfer may be recognized under the "know your customer" doctrine
even though the true owner may have been negligent with regard to lost or stolen
certificates. This result is justified on four policy grounds:
(1) As a practical matter the only way to control customer fraud is to
place an enforceable duty of policing transactions on the brokers;
(2) Brokers are generally in the best economic position to distribute
the loss among individual investors and to insure against the risks
created;
(3) Brokers, as professionals, are held to a higher standard of care
and professional responsibility than individual investors;
(4) Placing the burden on brokers is consistent with the policies behind
the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78a et seq. (1970).
See Comment, The "Know Your Customer" Rule of the NYSE: Liability of BrokerDealers Under the UCC and Federal Securities Laws, 1973 Duke L.J. 489, 494-99.
Thus, there should be no difficulty in imposing a similar burden on the broker in
situations where the attaching party was not negligent with regard to attachment of
the certificates.
100 Such verification would usually only require the broker to telephone the issuer
or transfer agent to determine whether an attachment of the shares had been made.
If no attachment had been made the broker could cut off subsequent transfers by
notifying the issuer or transfer agent that the shares were being transferred.
It is equally reasonable to place the burden of ascertaining a borrower's power to
pledge securities as collateral on the lender because such transactions are usually
preceded by a period of negotiation and credit investigation. ABA REPORT, supra
note 78, at 11. A lender would thus be able to follow the same procedure of contacting the issuer and securing its priority prior to disbursement of the loan.
101 ABA REPORT, supra note 78, at 3.
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rent with the task of physically transferring the stock certificates. 1 2 The
realization that it is no longer practicable to rely on the physical transfer
of stock certificates to establish legal rights has resulted in the proposal of
numerous alternative systems, each of which is based on the concept of the
reduced legal significance of the stock certificate. 10 3 As final evidence of
the limited importance of fully negotiable stock certificates to the functioning of modern securities markets one need only take note of the numerous
recommendations by legal commentators that a certificateless market
system be instituted 0 4 or that the present legal system be revised to facili10 5
tate the use of "uncertificated shares."'
2. Notice to Subsequent Transferees-Although it would be consistent
with existing "know your customer" standards'0 " to simply deny a seller
broker protection as a bona fide purchaser against attachments of share
interests accomplished without seizure of the certificates representing those
interests, 07 it is possible to reconcile such an attachment provision with
the manner in which the present law protects the rights of a subsequent
transferee of the stock certificates. Such a reconciliation would not only
further reduce the burden on seller brokers, it would also protect the
transferee in brokerless transactions involving a simultaneous exchange of
certificates for cash.
Article Eight emphasizes the protection of the interests of a bona fide
purchaser by recognizing the absolute priority of a bona fide purchaser's
08
interest over all adverse claims, including the claim of the true owner.1
However, as it has been concluded that limiting the protection afforded a
bona fide purchaser under Article Eight would have at most a minor impact
See Werner, supra note 80, at 605. Cf. Smith, supra note 72, at 924.
See generally Hearings on the Securities Industry Before the Subconn. oilConnerce and Finance of the House Comn. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess..(1972); Hearings on the Securities Industry Before the Subcomnln. on
Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Aflairs, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1972); Hearings on S. 3412, S. 3297, and S. 2551 Before the Subcommn. on
Securities of the Senate Comm. onl Banking, Housing, and Urban Aflairs, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1972). See also ABA REPORT, -supra
note 78.
104 See, e.g., Jolls, The Uniform Commercial Code and the Certificateless Society,
Symposium on the Certificateless Society, 26 Bus. LAW. 627 (1971); Jolls, Can We
Do Without Stock Certificates?: A Look at the Future, 23 Bus. LAW. 909 (1968);
Kendall, The Certificateless Society: A Realistic Appraisal, Symposium on the
Uniform Commercial Code and the Automated Society, 24 Bus. LAW. 909 (1968);
Werner, supra note 80.
105 See ABA REPORT, supra note 78.
100 See note 99 supra.
107 At least in New York it is arguable that compliance with the "know your
customer" rules is a necessary element which a broker must demonstrate in order to
establish his status as a bona fide purchaser. See Hartford Accident and Indemn. Co. v.
Walston & Co., 21 N.Y.2d 219, 234 N.E.2d 230, 287 N.Y.S.2d 58 (1967), modified
oil other grounds, 22 N.Y.2d 672, 238 N.E.2d 754, 291 N.Y.S.2d 366 (1968);
Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Md. v. Chem. Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 65 Misc. 2d 619,
318 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. 1970); N.Y. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 8-304,
8-318, Practice Commentary (McKinney 1964); Comment, The "Know Your Customner" Rule of the NYSE: Liability of Broker-Dealers Under the UCC and Federal
Securities Laws, 1973 DUKE L.J. 489.
10S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 8-301(1), (2).
102

103
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on the functioning of the securities markets and the liquidity of stock
certificates, 0 a a viable alternative to recognizing the absolute priority of a
bona fide purchaser would be to eliminate the possibility that a transferee
would need to claim bona fide purchaser status.110
One method of eliminating the need for a transferee to claim bona fide
purchaser status would be to ensure that all subsequent transferees take
the certificate with full notice of any potential adverse claims.'1 ' This could
be done by requiring that certificates representing share interests attachable
by service of notice on the corporation bear a transfer legend stating that
the shares are subject to attachment without seizure of the certificates, and
informing a potential transferee of the procedure for establishing the
priority of his claim. A transferee would not need the protection of Article
Eight as he would not go through with the transaction if he could not
112
establish the priority of his claim to the share interests with the issuer.
The possible use of notice as an alternative to the protection afforded by
bona fide purchaser status was recognized in Progressive Forwarding,Inc.
v. Cander Realty Corp.,113 in which the Supreme Court of New York
County granted an order directing an issuer corporation to cancel unsurrendered certificates registered in the name of a judgment debtor who had
fled the country. The court further directed that new certificates be issued
and sold at public auction to satisfy the claim of the judgment creditor.
This result was justified, notwithstanding the language of section 8-317 of
the UCC to the contrary, on the grounds that the transfer of the certificates
in question was subject to an agreement between the shareholder and the

109 See notes 70-100 and accompanying text supra.

110 It should be noted that the unhampered and undelayed circulation of securities
is less essential than the instant transferability of commercial paper. Folk, A
Premise, supra note 70, at 1380-81; ci. Israels, supra note 40, at 677. Thus, this proposal is easier to justify than a limitation on the protection afforded a holder in due
course under Article Three.
111A bona fide purchaser is defined in UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-302 as a
"
purchaser "for value in good faith and without notice of any adverse claim ....
However, Comment 1 to UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-317 (which defines valid
levy) indicates that the giving of notice to a transferee may not fulfill the requirement of that provision and that there must be no possibility that a purchaser in good
faith and without notice may take the security. Section 8-317, Comment I states in
part that
[a] valid levy cannot be made unless all possibility of the security
finding its way into a transferee's hands has been removed. This can
be accomplished only when the security has been reduced to possession
by a public officer or by the issuer.
It should be noted that the quoted language makes express reference to the UNIFORM
STOCK TRANSFER ACT provision (§ 13) which permitted attachment where the holder
was enjoined from transferring the certificate and it is quite possible that the
drafters did not consider the alternative of a levy which is valid against a
transferee having notice of the adverse claim.
112 For a discussion of how a transferee could establish the priority of his claim
see note 100 supra.
113 N.Y.L.J., May 6, 1969, at 2, 6 UCC REP. SERV. 390 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1969).
See also Neidorf v. Neidorf, 43 Misc. 2d 710, 252 N.Y.S.2d 354 (Sup. Ct. 1964)
(applying UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER ACT § 13).
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issuer corporation, and that this restriction was evidenced on the face of
14
the certificates.
Commentators have attacked Progressive Forwarding primarily on the
ground that it is questionable from the limited facts presented whether the
legend on the certificates was sufficient to protect a subsequent transferee.' 15 There is no reason, however, why a suitable legend, drafted
specifically for that purpose and conspicuously located on the certificate,
could not eliminate the need for a subsequent transferee to claim bona fide
purchaser status. 116
A requirement that all shares beneficially owned by an officer, director,
or controlling person bear such a legend would not create any undue
restraint on the alienability of such shares. 117 Upon receiving the certificates,
a potential transferee or the seller broker would be informed by the legend
that the transferee's position may be subordinate to that of a prior adverse
claim 118 recorded with the issuer or transfer agent. 110 The transferee could
then guarantee his position of priority and that of all subsequent transferees
by contacting the issuer or transfer agent pursuant to instructions contained
12
in the legend and informing him of the transfer. 0
Furthermore, such a transfer restriction would only supplement the
restraints which already apply to most shares beneficially owned by an
officer, director, or controlling person of a corporation. For example, if
the shares are registered pursuant to section 12 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934,-121 their transfer is subject to restrictive federal regulation
under section 16 of the same act,"12 ' while unregistered shares are generally
subject to a transfer restriction imposed by the issuer to preserve the exempt
status of the shares.

1 23

The UCC recognizes the validity of transfer restrictions on negotiable
securities as long as the restrictions are noted conspicuously on the cer-

114 N.Y.L.J., May 6, 1969, at 2, 6 UCC REP. SERV. 390 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1969).
Although not expressly discussed, it would appear that the court felt that section
8-317 was inapposite as the transfer legend provided the transferee with notice that
he should confirm the validity of the transfer with the issuer. The court also
placed special emphasis on the fact that the judgment debtor had fled the country,
making seizure of the certificates impossible.
115 See, e.g., C. ISRAELS & E. GUTTMAN, MODERN SECURITIES TRANSFERS § 1.07
(rev. ed. 1971); Jolls, Investment Securities, Uniform Commercial Code Annual
Survey, 25 Bus. LAW. 1173 (1970).
110 For an example of such a legend see Appendix infra. See note 100 supra.
117 See notes 105-07 supra.
118 An adverse claim is defined to include "a claim that a transfer was or would be
wrongful ..
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-30(1l). A transfer restriction is
treated as an adverse claim. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-204, Comment 1.
110 A corporation may delegate its powers and functions in respect to the maintenance of transfer records relating to its securities to a professional transfer agent.
Cf. C.

ISRAELS

& E. GUTTMAN, MODERN

SECURITIES

TRANSFERS

§§

7.02-.06

(rev.

ed. 1971).
120 The transferee would be protected as a purchaser under UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 8-301(1).
121 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1970).
122 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p et seq. (1970).
123 Folk, A Premise, supra note 70, at 1399.
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tificate. 124 A transferee who accepts certificates with notice of the transfer
restriction takes the certificates subject to any adverse claim stemming from
the restriction, but has a warranty action against the transferor should the
125
transfer be upset by an adverse claimant.
B. The Proposed Amendments and the Constitution
In many cases an officer, director, or controlling person cannot be
brought under the jurisdiction of a court and effective action lies only
against property of such person found within the jurisdiction of the court.
In other cases, where an officer, director, or controlling person is subject
to, or submits to, personal jurisdiction, it is possible for such person to
remove property from the jurisdiction before a judgment is rendered. Such
removal may well make it impossible for a victorious plaintiff to enforce a
judgment. It is especially important, therefore, that the attachment of
shares be allowed prior to a final determination of the merits of the case.
The Supreme Court of the United States, however, has traditionally taken
the position that due process considerations demand that any significant
deprivation of property by means of state action be preceded by reasonable
notice and opportunity for a hearing unless there is a countervailing compelling public interest. 126 The present application of this traditional
standard has been clouded by recent Court decisions 127 which raise two
questions with respect to the constitutionality of the attachment of corporate
shares to secure jurisdiction over a defendant or to insure the enforceability
of a judgment: (1) whether there is a sufficient state interest underlying
124 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 8-204.

The rights of a transferee with notice of a valid transfer restriction are protected by UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-306(2)(a) under which the transferor
warrants that his "transfer is effective and rightful." This concept of rightful transfer
includes freedom from any contractual restriction and thus includes transfer restrictions. By warranting that the transfer is "effective", the transferor guarantees
that all necessary endorsements are present and that no adverse claims exist which
would prevent registration of transfer into the name of the transferee. C. ISRAELS &
E. GUTTMAN, MODERN SECURITIES TRANSFERS §§ 4.05-.06 (rev. ed. 1971).
An issuer may, pursuant to UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 8-401(c),(e), 8-403,
refuse to register any transfer which does not comply with a valid transfer restriction,
and this refusal gives rise to the transferee's right to rescind or reject the tranfer
under §§ 8-306(2), 8-316. The vast majority of securities transfers involve brokers
who make similar warranties under section 8-306(5) and the transaction would be
thwarted long before the transferee ever saw the certificate. In most such transactions,
the first step would involve the seller broker's attempt to register the security out
of the seller's name. If the shares had been previously attached, the transaction
would not proceed beyond this initial step, for the issuer corporation would not
register the transfer. See Folk, A Premise, supra note 70, at 1401.
126 See Folk & Moyer, Sequestration in Delaware: A Constitutional Analysis, 73
COLUM. L. REV. 749, 756 (1973).
127 Compare North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975),
with Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974), aId with Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972), and with Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
For the purposes of this article it is assumed that a temporary, nonfinal deprivation,
such as occurs in a prejudgment attachment or garnishment, would be inconsistent
with due process requirements. See Gordon v. Michel, - Del. Ch. -, 297 A.2d 420
(Ch. 1972).
125
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the legislation to justify postponement of the defendant's right to a hearing
before possession of property is interfered with; and (2) whether quasi in
rem jurisdiction, upon which actions under the proposed amendments might
be based, should be subject to a "minimum contacts" test as required in the
case of in personam actions.
1. Sufficient State Interest-The state interest which the proposed
amendments would serve would be to confer upon state courts jurisdiction
over all controversies involving a breach by an officer, director, or controlling person of his fiduciary duty under state corporation law and
guarantee that injured shareholders are not without redress. The Supreme
Court in Fuentes v. Shevin,1 28 in finding replevin statutes in Florida and
Pennsylvania unconstitutional, recognized, in a footnote, that attachment
used to secure jurisdiction in a state court is "clearly a most basic and
important public interest. ' 129 The Court set out a three-part test for determining whether a public interest is of sufficient importance to justify
postponing the defendant's right to notice and a prior hearing. Under this
test the seizure must be "directly necessary" to secure the important public
interest; there must be a special need for prompt action; and the procedure
130
must be subject to the strict control of the state.
In subsequent decisions the Court has further clarified the meaning of
the latter two factors. In Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.' 31 the Court upheld
the constitutionality of the Louisiana sequestration procedure which provided for the issuance of writs by a judge 32 upon the filing of an affidavit
clearly setting out the nature and amount of the claim and grounds for
relief, 133 as well as a post-seizure hearing at which the writ would be
dissolved unless the attaching party proved the ground on which the writ
was issued." 4 Mitchell was followed by North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v.
Di-Chem, Inc.135 in which the Court held a Georgia garnishment procedure
unconstitutional as failing to have the "saving characteristics" of the
Louisiana procedure. 136 It seems clear, despite the arguably inconsistent
nature of the latest pronouncements, that there is sufficient state control
over attachment or garnishment proceedings if the authorizing writ is
issuable only by a judge. Furthermore, it seems clear that an attachment
procedure would not conflict with due process requirements if it requires
the plaintiff to plead more than conclusory allegations and provides for an
immediate post-seizure hearing at which the plaintiff must present proof
of the grounds on which the writ was issued or face dissolution of the writ.
The Supreme Court has not, however, elaborated further on the Fuentes
requirement that the seizure be "directly necessary" to secure an important
128407 U.S. 67 (1972).
129 407 U.S. at 91 n.23.
130

407 U.S. at 91-93.

131 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
132

See 416 U.S. at 606 n.5.

13:3
LA. CODE CIv. PRO. art. 3501
134 LA. CODE CIv. PRO. art. 3506

(1975).
419 U.S. at 607.

135419 U.S. 601
136

(1960).
(1960).
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public interest. 137 While it is unquestionable that a state has an important
interest in "providing a forum to resolve controversies properly subject to
its jurisdiction," 13 8 some commentators have read the "directly necessary"
language as implying that prejudgment seizure provisions used to secure
jurisdiction would be constitutionally acceptable only where seizure is the
sole means by which a court can secure jurisdiction over the controversy. 139
In the absence of a definitive Supreme Court pronouncement the issue
cannot be fully resolved. However, those courts which have reached the
issue have not given a literal reading to the "directly necessary" language. 140 The leading decision on this question is Lebowitz v. Forbes
Leasing & Finance Corp.,141 which dealt with the constitutionality of the
Pennsylvania foreign attachment rules. 14' In Lebowitz a Pennsylvania
resident commenced an action for invalid discharge against a Delaware
corporation by writ of foreign attachment executed by sheriff's service on
two banks holding funds deposited by the defendant corporation, which
was also subject to personal service under the Pennsylvania long-arm
statute. 143 The court found that the availability of a long-arm statute did
not obviate the necessity for attachment in that
in contrast [to jurisdiction under the long-arm statute] foreign
attachment provides an immediate and certain basis on which to
exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. It thereby
constitutes a greater inducement for such a defendant to appear
and consequently, accomplishes one of the principal
objectives
144
underlying the enactment of foreign legislation.
Since the primary function of a provision allowing attachment of shareholder interests in corporations without seizure of certificates would be to
permit the attachment of stock of foreign nonresident shareholders, it may
be argued that the provision should be limited in application to situations
in which the defendant shareholder is not otherwise subject to service.
However, where the defendant is properly served and ignores the service
because he and his assets are outside the physical jurisdiction of United
States courts, such a limitation would totally emasculate application of the
proposed amendments. In such cases the ability to seize all available assets
is especially important, both to compel the defendant's appearance and to
provide some basis for satisfying the plaintiff's claim should the defendant
refuse to appear. Requiring pre-seizure notice would only increase the
137

407 U.S. at 91.

See Folk & Moyer, supra note 126, at 764.
See id. at 764-65; Comment, Foreign Attachment Alter Sniadach and Fuentes,
73 COLUM. L. REv. 342, 349-53 (1973). This proposition has been accepted by at
least one noted jurist. Tucker v. Burton, 319 F. Supp. 567, 572 (D.D.C. 1970)
(Wright, J., dissenting).
140 Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Finance Corp., 456 F.2d 979 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972); Tucker v. Burton, 319 F. Supp. 567 (D.D.C. 1970);
Property Research Financial Corp. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. App. 3d 413, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 233 (1972).
141 456 F.2d 979 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972).
142 PA. R. Civ. P. 1251-79, 1285-92.
143 456 F.2d at 982.
138
139

144

Id.
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possibility that a defendant would attempt to thwart the amendments by
means of an intervening transfer. 145 The reasoning of the court in Lebowitz
appears, therefore, especially applicable to the proposed amendments and
the state interest upon which they are founded.
2. Establishing Jurisdiction by Means of Prejudgment Attachment-It
has long been recognized that the foundation of a court's jurisdiction is the
physical power which it may exert over persons or property found within
the geographic boundaries of its jurisdiction. 146 The exercise of quasi in
rem jurisdiction, therefore, is predicated on the ability of a court to seize
or otherwise proceed against the res. 14 7 Where the res consists of intangible
property, it is generally recognized that, for purposes of jurisdiction, attachment, or garnishment, the situs of the intangible property is wherever
the debtor or garnishee is subject to in personam jurisdiction. 148
In Delaware, where the tangible stock certificate is accorded lesser legal
significance, it is provided by statute that the situs of the stock in a Delaware
corporation is always considered to be Delaware. 149 This statute provides a
basis for the sequestration of stock owned by nonresident shareholders in
Delaware corporations, 150 and a similar provision would be necessary to
give effect to the proposed amendments.
Two leading commentators on Delaware corporation law, however, have
questioned whether the use of such prejudgment seizure provisions to
establish jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant may result in a denial
of due process.' 5 ' The basis of their analysis is the isolation of two distinct
types of quasi in rem actions: (1) those in which the res is the direct focus
of the controversy; and (2) those in which the res is merely a jurisdictional
tool for bringing a claim unrelated to the subject property. 152 These commentators argue that where quasi in rem jurisdiction is used to bring a claim
unrelated to the subject property, as would be the case where jurisdiction
over corporate shares was used to enforce a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty, that in substance the action has more in common with an in personam action. 153 They conclude that the jurisdictional test in such cases
should be a measure of the state's interest in the controversy, and that the
statutory situs of the shareholder's interest should not control." 4 To this
end it is suggested that quasi in rem jurisdiction under the Delaware
sequestration statute should be recognized only where the "minimum
145 See Gordon v. Michel, -

Del. Ch. -, 297 A.2d 420 (Ch. 1972).

146 See, e.g., McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
147See Pennington v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 243 U.S. 269 (1917);

Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714 (1877); C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
CIVIL § 1070 (1969).
148 See, e.g., Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905); Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111,
216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). See also Comment, Foreign Attachment
After Sniadach and Fuentes, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 342, 353 (1973).
149 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 169 (1953).
150 See Folk & Moyer, supra note 126, at 777-89.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 780-82.
153 See id.at 782.
154 Id. at 784.
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contacts" test 155 used to determine the availability of in personam jurisdiction can be met, especially where the plaintiff is a nonresident as well.' 1 6
While ultimate resolution of this issue must await Supreme Court
determination, it should be noted that present case law is contrary to this
position. It has been held by at least one federal district court that the
"4minimum contacts" test is inapplicable where the plaintiff invokes quasi
in rem jurisdiction.1 5 7 This result has been justified not only on the ground
that the state has an interest in aiding its citizens in prosecuting claims
against nonresident defendants, but also on the ground that there is an
important state interest in having the courts of the state in which a corporation is organized decide corporate law questions involving that corporation. One court has summarized this position by stating that
a director or officer should b. obliged to respond in [the
jurisdiction in which the corporation is organized] which is in a
of
unique position to make an authoritative determination
158
'housekeeping' issues and to grant complete relief.
This analysis should apply equally to a controlling person and would appear
to justify recognition of a suit by a nonresident shareholder against an
officer, director, or controlling person whose breach of fiduciary duty
should be adjudicated under the law of the state in which the corporation
was organized.
IV.

CONCLUSION

As illustrated in the foregoing discussion, a provision which allows the
shares of officers, directors, and controlling persons to be attached without
the actual seizure of the stock certificates representing the shares, notwithstanding the impact of such a provision on the negotiability of stock
certificates, would not disrupt the functioning of the securities markets.
Furthermore, such a provision could be drafted to minimize its impact on
the manner in which existing law protects the rights of a bona fide transferee of the stock certificate by requiring a restrictive legend to be carried
on each certificate owned by such a person, and to comply with recent
Supreme Court standards for prejudgment seizures by requiring judicial
supervision over the issuing of writs of attachment and by providing for
a post-seizure hearing at which the officer, director, or controlling person
could challenge the propriety of the attachment.
In order to provide shareholders with a more effective remedy in actions
155 The principle that due process considerations require some minimum contact
between the forum state and an individual or corporate defendant being subjected to
in personam jurisdiction was first recognized by Chief Justice Stone in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) and has undergone further development in subsequent Supreme Court decisions. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235 (1958); McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Perkins
v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Traveler's Health Association v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
156 See Folk & Moyer, supra note 126, at 767, 784.
157 United States Industries, Inc. v. Gregg, 348 F. Supp. 1004 (D. Del. 1972).
158 Gordon v. Michel, -

Del. Ch. -,

297 A.2d 420, 422-23 (Ch. 1972).
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based on a breach of fiduciary duty it is proposed that a section be added to
the ABA-ALI Model Business Corporation Act which would provide for
the initiation of suits against officers, directors, and controlling persons for
a breach of their fiduciary duty to the corporation or to its shareholders by
attachment of their share interests in the state in which the corporation is
organized. Such a provision should provide for direct judicial supervision
over the attachment process and an immediate post-seizure hearing, and
should contain language which clearly establishes the jurisdiction of the
courts of the state over such share interests, without regard to the location
of the stock certificates.
To minimize potential conflict with the basic negotiability premise of the
UCC, it is recommended that ABA-ALI Model Business Corporation Act
section 23 be amended to require that all shares which are beneficially
owned by an officer, director, or controlling person bear a transfer legend
sufficient to give notice to any subsequent transferee that the shares may
be subject to a prior levy and specifying the procedure for establishing a
senior right.
Finally, it is proposed that section 8-317 of the UCC be amended so as
to recognize as valid an attachment of shares of a corporation beneficially
owned by an officer, director, or controlling person of that corporation by
means of service of notice of such attachment on the corporation.
APPENDIX

PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE ABA-ALI MODEL
BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT ADDING SECTION 49A

Subject to the provisions of section 49, any person who is a holder of
record of shares or voting trust certificates in a domestic corporation may
institute an action against any nonresident officer or director of the
domestic corporation, or against any other person who directly or indirectly
is the beneficial owner of 10 percent or more of any class of security, for
breach of his fiduciary duty to the corporation or to its shareholders. Such
action may be commenced by the filing of a complaint, containing specific
facts verified by separate affidavit setting out in detail the nature of the
violation and the grounds for recovery, and requesting an order of the
Court directing such nonresident defendant to appear before the Court
on a designated day not less than thirty days from the date of the filing.
Such an order shall be issuable only by a judge [insert state court designation], who shall make all inquiries necessary to verify the validity of the
complaint and to verify the necessity for prejudgment relief.
Notice of the order shall be served upon a nonresident defendant by
registered air mail letter sent to the defendant's last known address, and
shall be published pursuant to court rules in the state or country of residence of the defendant. Such notice shall contain a statement of the
defendant's rights and liabilities under this Act.
A copy of the order, when served on the issuing corporation, at its
corporate headquarters or at the place where the transfer records for its
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securities are maintained, shall effectively attach all shares of the issuing
corporation of which the defendant is, directly or indirectly, the beneficial
owner. Such shares may be sold under order of the Court, and the proceeds
applied to meet the claim of the plaintiff, if the defendant fails to appear
or otherwise defaults.
The nonresident defendant may, at any time on or before the day on
which he is ordered to appear, make a special appearance before the Court
granting the order solely to contest the validity of the order.
Any transfer or assignment of certificates representing the attached
shares which occurs subsequent to service of the order upon the issuing
corporation shall be void. Upon sale of the shares under order of the
Court, the certificates representing the shares, if still in the possession of
the defendant, shall be voided and cancelled on the books of the corporation. The purchaser of the shares under order of the Court shall be entitled
to and have all the right, title, and interest of the defendant in the seized
shares, and such sale shall transfer to the purchaser all the right, title, and
interest in the shares as fully as if the defendant had transferred the same
to the purchaser in accordance with law.
For the purposes of this Act, the situs of the shares of stock in a
159
domestic corporation shall be this State.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO ABA-ALI MODEL
BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT SECTION 23

All certificates which represent share interests directly or indirectly
beneficially owned by an officer, director, or any other person owning
beneficially 10 percent or more of any class of equity security shall carry
the following legend.
NOTICE: The share interests represented by this certificate are
subject to ATTACHMENT and LEVY by means of judicial
order served on [insert appropriate corporate officer or transfer
agent]. Such ATTACHMENT and LEVY will have priority over
any right, title, or interest created by a subsequent transfer of
this certificate. Any party may obtain information regarding
prior ATTACHMENT or LEVY and secure priority over subsequent ATTACHMENT or LEVY by contacting [insert address,
phone number, and cable address of appropriate corporate
officer or transfer agent].
159 Besides providing a basis for a court's jurisdiction over share interests, this provision should also control should a court in another jurisdiction be asked to issue a
writ for the seizure of stock certificates. See Mills v. Jacobs, 333 Pa. 231, 4 A.2d 152
(1939), in which a Pennsylvania court held that the state of incorporation has exclusive jurisdiction over situs and, therefore, a Pennsylvania statute providing for
attachment of corporate shares by means of seizure of the certificates could not be
used to attach the shares of a Delaware corporation, notwithstanding the fact that
the certificates were located in Pennsylvania.
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PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO UNIFORM COMMERCIAL

CODE SECTION 8-317160

Section 8-317. Attachment or Levy Upon Security
(1) Subject to the exceptions in subsections (2), (3), and (4), no attachment or levy upon a security or other interest represented thereby which
is outstanding shall be valid until the security is actually seized by the
officer making the attachment or levy.
(2) A security which has been surrendered to the issuer may be attached
or levied upon by service of notice of garnishment either at the registered
office of the issuer in the jurisdiction in which it was organized or at the
place where the transfer records for such security are maintained.
(3) A security which is beneficially owned by an officer or director of
the issuer or by any other person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial
owner of 10 percent or more of any class of security of the issuer may be
attached or levied upon by service of a writ of attachment, issuable only
by a judge, at the registered office of the issuer in the jurisdiction in which
it was organized or at the place where the transfer records for such security
are maintained.
(4) A creditor whose debtor is the owner of a security shall be entitled
to such aid from courts of appropriate jurisdiction, by injunction or otherwise, in reaching such security or in satisfying the claim by means thereof
as is allowed at law or in equity in regard to property which cannot readily
be attached or levied upon by ordinary legal process.
-Michael H. Woolever

160 The basic format of this amendment is taken from an amendment proposed by
the Committee on Stock Certificates of the American Bar Association, Section on
Corporation, Banking, and Business Law. ABA REPORT, supra note 78, at B-23.

